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667 
THE PROBLEM OF RISK IN INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL LAW 
MARK A. SUMMERS

 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Calibrating individual responsibility for group criminality is one of the 
most difficult challenges international criminal law faces. Beginning at 
Nuremberg and continuing with the ad hoc tribunals, courts have struggled 
with this issue.
1
 International crimes are, by definition, large-scale 
operations involving hundreds, even thousands, of participants.
2
 Because 
the mission of international criminal law is to punish “the most serious 
crimes of concern to the international community,”3 its targets are 
defendants who occupy civilian or military leadership positions while the 
crimes they are prosecuted for are committed by individuals loosely 
connected to the leaders on battlefields miles away.
4
 The leaders, who set 
in motion a campaign of ethnic cleansing or genocide, are obviously more 
culpable than those who implement the plan. But should the leaders be 
held responsible for all the crimes committed by their subordinates, even if 
those crimes were not part of the original plan?  
One solution could be enterprise liability; that is, defendants are liable 
because of their membership in the group and not for crimes committed by 
others in the group that are attributed to them. This solution was attempted 
at Nuremberg based on a United States proposal that the International 
Military Tribunal (IMT) would “try the criminality of the organizations 
themselves” and individual defendants would then be convicted based on 
their membership in those organizations.
5
 The IMT partially rejected this 
 
 
  Professor of Law, Barry University, Dwayne O. Andreas School of Law; B.A., Washington 
and Jefferson College; J.D., West Virginia University; LL.M, Cambridge University (International 
Law). I would like to thank the Barry University School of Law for its support in the writing of this 
Article. 
 1. Neha Jain, The Control Theory of Perpetration in International Criminal Law, 12 
CHI.J.INT’L L. 159, 160 (2011). 
 2. Id. at 161. 
 3. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Preamble, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3 
[hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
 4. Jain, supra note 1, at 161–62. 
 5. Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal 
Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law, 93 CAL. L. 
REV. 75, 113 (2005) [hereinafter Danner & Martinez]; Charter of the International Military Tribunal at 
Nuremberg, Annex to the London Agreement, art. 10, Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter 
Nuremberg Charter]: 
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solution by placing the burden on the prosecution to prove that a defendant 
voluntarily and knowingly participated in the group’s criminal activities.6 
Since Nuremberg, no international criminal court has accepted group 
membership alone as a basis for individual criminal liability.
7
 
While enterprise liability was not accepted in international criminal 
law, conspiracy, as a way of attributing liability for crimes committed by 
members of a criminal group, was.
8
 Article 6 of the Nuremberg Charter
9
 
provided that defendants who participated in the common plan or 
conspiracy were responsible “for all acts performed by any persons in 
execution of such plan.” This was the seed from which the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia’s (ICTY) doctrine of joint criminal 
enterprise grew.
10
 
In 1993, the U.N. Security Council created the ICTY to prosecute 
crimes that occurred during the war in Yugoslavia.
11
 A year later, the 
Security Council established another ad hoc tribunal, the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), to prosecute the crimes that 
occurred during the genocide in Rwanda.
12
 Although these tribunals had 
jurisdiction over crimes, which by their very nature are usually 
collective,
13
 their governing statutes seemingly ignored this fact in the 
provisions dealing with individual criminal responsibility. Those 
provisions stipulated that “a person who planned, instigated, ordered, [or] 
 
 
In cases where a group or organization is declared criminal by the Tribunal, the competent 
national authority of any Signatory shall have the right to bring individuals to trial for 
membership therein before national, military or occupation courts. 
 6. Danner & Martinez, supra note 5 at 115; see also Saira Mohamed, Remarks by Saira 
Mohamed, 105 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L PROC. 321 (Mar. 23–26 2011) (observing that the IMT “certainly 
placed significant limitations on the reach of conspiracy liability and the criminal organizations 
doctrine”).  
 7. Danner & Martinez, supra note 5 at 109. 
 8. Id. at 116. 
 9. Nuremberg Charter, supra note 5, art. 6 provides: 
Leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices participating in the formulation or execution 
of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all 
acts performed by any persons in execution of such plan.  
Id. (emphasis added). 
 10. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, art. 7, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute]. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 
1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute].  
 13. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 8 (War crimes are “committed as part of a plan or 
policy or as part of a large scale commission of such crimes”) and art. 7 (Crimes against humanity are 
“part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population”); see also Jain, 
supra note 1 (“An international crime such as genocide typically involves widespread participation by 
a very large number of people. . . .”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol13/iss4/6
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committed” a crime was individually responsible without mentioning 
attribution of criminal liability for crimes committed by others who were 
members of a group to which the defendant belonged.
14
 They contained no 
analog to Article 6 of the Nuremberg Charter or any other type of 
associational liability, except aiding and abetting another person in the 
planning, preparation, or execution of a crime.
15
 But because aiders and 
abettors need only know that they are providing assistance to the principal 
perpetrator of the crime, they are viewed as having a “lower level of 
criminal culpability,”16 which would inadequately reflect the guilt of those 
in leadership positions.
17
 
Not surprisingly, then, the ICTY faced the issue of how to attribute 
liability for crimes among the members of a group in its first case.
18
 The 
Tadić court solved the problem by finding that a defendant, who was part 
of a joint criminal enterprise (JCE), was liable for crimes committed by 
other members of the group.
19
 The Tadić Appeals Chamber discovered 
three forms of JCE liability—JCE I (basic/shared intent); JCE II 
(systemic/prison camp); and JCE III (extended/other foreseeable 
crimes)
20—which it said were grounded in customary international law.21 
Because it makes members of a JCE III liable for crimes that are 
outside the criminal purpose of the enterprise so long as those crimes are 
“foreseeable,”22 the Tadić Court’s conclusion that the extended form of 
liability (JCE III) is customary law has been vigorously challenged by 
 
 
 14. ICTY Statute, supra note 10, art. 7(1); ICTR Statue, supra note 12, art. 6(1). The statutes of 
other post-Nuremberg ad hoc tribunals are identical in this respect to those of the ICTY and ICTR. See 
Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 6(1), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315 (Aug. 13, 2000), 
available at http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=uClnd1MJeEw%3D&; Law on the 
Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers, art. 29, 27(NS/RKM/1004/006) (Oct. 27, 2004), 
available at http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/legaldocuments/KR_Law_as_amended_27_ 
Oct_ 2004_Eng.pdf. 
 15. Significantly, none of these statutes provided for attribution of liability by conspiracy as the 
Nuremberg Charter did. See supra text accompanying note 9; See, e.g., ICTY Statute, supra note 10, 
art. 7(1). 
 16. Gunel Guliyeva, The Concept of Joint Criminal Enterprise and ICC Jurisdiction, 5 EYES ON 
THE ICC 49, 51 (2008–2009) (quoting Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Judgment 
(Int’l. Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999) [hereinafter Tadić Appeal Judgment]. 
 17. Id. (There are “situations where the weight of other participants’ contributions is no less than 
that of physical perpetrators and where the previously mentioned modes of participation do not fairly 
reflect ‘the moral gravity’ of such contributions.”) (quoting Appeals Tadić Appeal Judgment). 
 18. Tadić Appeal Judgment, supra note 17. 
 19. Id. ¶¶ 226–28. 
 20. Guliyeva, supra note 16, at 52. The criteria for liability under the three forms of JCE will be 
discussed in greater detail in Part II, infra. 
 21. Tadić Appeal Judgment, supra note 17, ¶¶ 226–28.  
 22. Id. ¶ 204 passim. 
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670 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 13:667 
 
 
 
 
scholars.
23
 Also, it has been argued that there is no basis for JCE III 
liability in the statutes of the international criminal tribunals.
24
 Despite 
these criticisms and many others,
25
 JCE I and II, as well as JCE III, have 
been “adopted without modification by most subsequent cases.”26 
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC),
27
 unlike 
the ICTY and ICTR statutes, has two provisions dealing with group 
criminality. Article 25(3)(a) provides that a person who “[c]ommits . . . a 
crime [within the jurisdiction of the Court] whether as an individual, [or] 
jointly with another or through another person . . . is criminally 
responsible.”28 Article 25(d) makes a person criminally liable who “[i]n 
any other way contributes to the commission or attempted commission of 
such a crime by a group of persons acting with a common purpose.”29 
Joint liability in Article 25(3)(a) reflects the concept of co-perpetration,
30
 
while Article 25(d) resembles a form of aiding and abetting collective 
criminality.
31
 
Like JCE I, Article 25(a) makes a co-perpetrator liable for crimes that 
are expressly part of a plan formulated by a group of which he was a 
member even though he did not perform every act necessary to complete 
the crimes.
32
 Since the Rome Statute was elaborated, however, it has been 
the subject of intense scholarly debate whether Article 25(a)(3) attributes 
liability for so-called “deviant” crimes, i.e., those that are not part of the 
plan but are nonetheless foreseeable consequences of it.
33
  
 
 
 23. Jens David Ohlin, Joint Intentions to Commit International Crimes, 11 CHI. J. INT’L L. 693, 
709, 711–12 (2010–2011) (questioning whether prior to Tadić “there was a single case applying 
international criminal law or the international law of war that held a defendant vicariously responsible 
for the foreseeable actions of other members of a common criminal enterprise that nonetheless fell 
outside the scope of the criminal plan”); Id. at 712 (concluding that “there remains no non-question-
begging rationale for JCE III in customary international law”); George P. Fletcher& Jens David Ohlin, 
Reclaiming Fundamental Principles of Criminal Law in the Darfur Case, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 539, 
548 (2005) (“The history of the doctrine [JCE] is one of judicial creativity.”). 
 24. Kai Ambos, Joint Criminal Enterprise and Command Responsibility, 5 J.INT’L CRIM. JUST. 
159, 173 (2007) (“JCE II and III constitute new and autonomous (systemic) concepts of imputation 
without an explicit basis in written international criminal law.”). Art. 6 of the Nuremberg Charter 
contradicts this conclusion. In fact, it goes even further than JCE III by imposing liability for “all 
acts,” not just foreseeable ones. Nuremberg Charter, supra note 5. 
 25. The criticisms of JCE are catalogued in Guliyeva, supra note 16, at 59–65. 
 26. Ambos, supra note 24, at 171. 
 27. Rome Statute, supra note 3. 
 28. Id. art. 25(3)(a). 
 29. Id. art. 25(3)(d). 
 30. Jain, supra note 1, at 182–83; Ambos, supra note 24 at 170–71. 
 31. Ambos, supra note 24, at 172. 
 32. See infra note 54 and accompanying text.  
 33. Compare, e.g., ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 212 (2d ed. 2008) 
(finding that all three types of JCE are included in Article 25(3)(a)), with Fletcher & Ohlin, supra note 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol13/iss4/6
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The search for an answer to the question whether the Rome Statute 
includes a form of such liability depends upon another of its provisions, 
Article 30, which states that “[u]nless otherwise provided, a person shall 
be criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Court only if the material elements are committed with 
intent and knowledge.”34 In the first case decided by an ICC Trial 
Chamber, Prosecutor v. Lubanga,
35
 the court explicitly rejected the earlier 
holding of a Pre-Trial Chamber
36
 when it decided that liability based on 
some form of recklessness or dolus eventualis (JCE III)
37
 was 
“deliberately excluded” from Article 30.38 
Despite the Lubanga Trial Chamber’s rejection of recklessness and its 
civil law cousin, dolus eventualis, as mental states which could support a 
conviction for a violation of international criminal law, some theory of 
liability for conduct where the mental state of the perpetrator is less than 
intentional or knowing is essential if the ICC is to carry out its mandate to 
“put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes.”39 Moreover, 
since risk-taking is an essential feature of recklessness,
40
 the Lubanga 
Trial Chamber opened the door to such an approach when it held that the 
implementation of the co-perpetrators’ common plan must “[embody] a 
sufficient risk that, if events follow the ordinary course, a crime will be 
committed.”41  
There is, however, a lack of clarity in international criminal law 
regarding the standard that should be applied in attributing liability for 
risky conduct.
42
 An approach that is too lax can result in overly expansive 
liability that exceeds culpability.
43
 An approach that is too restrictive can 
produce impunity for conduct that is worthy of punishment.
44
 This Article 
 
 
23, at 548 (arguing that Article 25(3)(a) “effectively replaced” JCE as it was applied by the ICTY), 
and Ambos, supra note 24, at 171–72 (asserting that JCE I is a form of co-perpetration within the 
meaning of Article 25(3)(a) but JCE II and III are not). 
 34. Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 30(1). 
 35. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-248, Judgment (Mar. 14, 2012) 
[hereinafter Lubanga Judgment]. 
 36. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges 
(Jan. 29, 2007) [hereinafter Lubanga PTC Decision]. 
 37. See Johan D. van der Vyver, infra note 138, at 243–44. 
 38. Lubanga Judgment, supra note 35, at ¶ 1011. 
 39. Rome Statute, supra note 3, at Preamble. 
 40. MODEL PENAL CODE, cmt. § 2.02 (1985). 
 41. Lubanga Judgment at ¶ 984. 
 42. See, e.g., infra pp. 685–86. 
 43. Ronald C. Slye & Beth Van Schaack, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: The ESSENTIALS 
293 (2009). 
 44. Id. 
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will explore the causes of this lack of clarity beginning with the Tadić case 
and the post-Tadić decisions of the ICTY. Then it will analyze the nascent 
case law of the ICC to see how the Court has dealt with this problem so 
far. Finally, this Article will suggest a solution, based on the Model Penal 
Code approach to recklessness, which strikes the proper balance between 
over attribution and under punishment. 
II. TADIĆ AND CRIMINAL LIABILITY BASED ON RECKLESSNESS 
In Tadić, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY faced a dilemma. Tadić 
had been acquitted by the Trial Chamber of the most serious crimes with 
which he was charged, the murders of five individuals from the village of 
Jaskići.45 His participation in those crimes did not amount to direct 
perpetration,
46
 nor was he liable under the theory of superior 
responsibility.
47
 Without another theory of individual responsibility,
48
 the 
Trial Chamber’s decision would have to stand. Consequently, the Appeals 
Chamber searched for and found what it deemed to be a theory of 
customary international law
49
 that justified Tadić’s conviction. The theory 
was “common purpose” liability,50 which the Tadić court said 
“encompasses three distinct categories of collective criminality,”51 which 
have come to be known as Joint Criminal Enterprise (JCE) I, II and III.
52
 
 
 
 45. Tadić Appeal Judgment ¶ 172. 
 46. Direct perpetration is planning, instigating, ordering or committing. ICTY Statute, supra note 
10, art. 7(1). For an analysis of the evidence against Tadić, see infra p. 676. 
 47. ICTY Statute, supra note 10, art. 7(3).  
 48. Tadić could have been held liable as an aider and abettor under ICTY Statute, art. 7(1), but to 
have done so would have “understate[d] the degree of [his] criminal responsibility.” Tadić Appeal 
Judgment at ¶ 192. 
 49. Tadić Appeal Judgment ¶¶ 194–95.  
 50. Tadić Appeal Judgment ¶ 195. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Commentators have criticized the Tadić Appeals Chambers’ conclusion that the third 
category of JCE (JCE III) is customary international law. See, e.g., Danner & Martinez, supra note 5, 
at 110 (“The cases cited in Tadić . . . do not support the sprawling form of JCE, particularly the 
extended form of this kind of liability, currently employed at the ICTY.”); Kai Ambos, Amicus Curiae 
Brief in the Matter of the Co-Prosecutors’ Appeal of the Closing Order Against Kaing Guek Eav 
“Duch” dated 8 August 2008, 20 Criminal Law Forum 353, 385–86 (2009), available at 
http://www.springerlink. com/content/1046-8374/20/2-3/. More recently, one of the ad hoc post-ICTY 
tribunals, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, held that JCE III was not customary 
international law in 1975–1979, the time period relevant to Case 002. Prosecutor v. Ieng et al., 
Decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber on the Appeals Against the Co-Investigative Judges Order on Joint 
Criminal Enterprise (JCE), ¶¶ 77–78, and 87, Case No. 002-19-09-2007-ECCC/OCIJ (PTC38) (May 
20, 2010), available at http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/documents/courtdoc/D97_15_9_ 
EN.pdf. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol13/iss4/6
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While this Article focuses principally on JCE III, a brief description of 
all three forms is appropriate.  
A. JCE I 
The most basic, and least controversial, form of JCE liability is the 
common enterprise/shared common intention category (JCE I).
53
 The 
Tadić Appeals Chamber described JCE I as,  
. . . all co-defendants, acting pursuant to a common design possess 
the same criminal intention; for instance, the formulation of a plan 
among the co-perpetrators to kill, where, in effecting this common 
design (and even if each co-perpetrator carries out a different role 
with it), they nevertheless all possess the intent to kill. . . .
54
  
Unfortunately, this form of JCE could not support a finding that Tadić had 
participated in the murders. While the evidence proved that he “actively 
took part in the common criminal purpose to rid the Prijedor region of the 
non-Serb population,” and that it was “beyond doubt” that he was “aware 
of the killings accompanying the commission of inhumane acts against the 
non-Serb population,”55 evidence of awareness (knowledge) was 
insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Tadić shared the 
intention to kill the victims. 
B. JCE II 
The second category of JCE liability—the “systemic form”56—is not 
relevant to the facts in Tadić.57 This form of liability is derived from the 
concentration camp cases where, in order to establish the liability of the 
camp commander, or others higher up the chain of command, the 
prosecution must prove: 
(i) the existence of an organized system to ill-treat detainees and 
commit the various crimes alleged; (ii) the accused’s awareness of 
the nature of the system; and (iii) the fact that the accused in some 
way actively participated in enforcing the system, i.e., encouraged, 
 
 
 53. See Ambos, supra note 24, at 160. 
 54. Tadić Appeal Judgment ¶ 196. 
 55. Id. ¶ 231. 
 56. Id. ¶¶ 202–03; Ambos, supra note 24, at 160 (describing JCE II as the “systemic form” of 
JCE). 
 57. Tadić Appeal Judgment ¶ 203. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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aided and abetted or in any case participated in the realisation of the 
common criminal design.
58
 
Based on these criteria, JCE II requires knowledge of the result (ill 
treatment of prisoners) and some affirmative act of participation in the 
enterprise. JCE II could not solve the problem the Tadić Appeals Chamber 
faced because, most obviously, the crimes did not take place in a prison 
camp setting. So the Tadić court had to look even further, venturing into 
what some believe was entirely new territory,
59
 where it found JCE III.  
C. JCE III 
The third category of JCE, the “so-called ‘extended’ joint enterprise,”60 
exists where one of the co-actors commits a crime not within the scope of 
the common plan but which constitutes a “natural and foreseeable 
consequence” of the execution of the plan.61 The Tadić Appeals Chamber 
gave an example of JCE III that was eerily similar to the facts in Tadić 
itself. It posited a hypothetical common plan to ethnically cleanse a village 
during which one or more of the villagers were killed.
62
 While killing 
civilians was not part of the plan, “it was nevertheless foreseeable that the 
forcible removal of civilians at gunpoint might well result in the deaths of 
one or more [of them].”63  
Here, unlike JCE I or JCE II, attribution of criminal liability for the 
murders is cut loose from the mens rea requirements of intent to produce, 
or even knowledge of, the result. Instead criminal attribution rests on the 
more elastic concept of foreseeability. No wonder ICTY prosecutors have 
used JCE as a theory of liability so frequently;
64
 it relieves them to a 
substantial degree of their burden of proof and exposes defendants to 
punishment for the most serious offenses on proof arguably amounting to 
little more than simple negligence.
65
  
 
 
 58. Id. ¶ 202. 
 59. See supra note 52; see also Ambos, supra note 24, at 173. 
 60. Ambos, supra note 24, at 160. 
 61. Tadić Appeal Judgment ¶ 204. 
 62. Id.  
 63. Id. 
 64. One study showed that from its genesis in Tadić until 2004, JCE was alleged in 64% of the 
ICTY indictments. Danner & Martinez, supra note 5, at 107–08. If “acting in concert” is added as a 
theory for attributing liability, the total rises to 81%. Id. 
 65. Id. at 108–09. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol13/iss4/6
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Tadić set out the elements that must be proven to establish membership 
in a JCE III.
66
 There are three actus reus elements that are the same for all 
three categories of JCE:
67
 (1) a plurality of persons; (2) a common plan, 
design or purpose amounting to or involving the commission of a crime 
within the ICTY statute; and (3) a participation element—the members of 
the group must assist in or contribute to the execution of the plan.
68
  
The mens rea element, however, is different for JCE I and JCE III. For 
JCE I, the mens rea is “the intent to perpetrate a certain crime” shared by 
all the co-perpetrators.
69
 By contrast, for JCE III, there must be “the 
intention to participate in and further the criminal activity or the criminal 
purpose of a group . . . or in any event to the commission of a crime by the 
group,”70 and for a defendant to be liable for a crime other than one 
included in the group’s plan, it must have been “foreseeable that such a 
crime might be perpetrated by one or other members of the group and . . . 
the accused willingly took that risk.”71  
The post-Tadić cases did not interpret its holding consistently, leading 
to substantial confusion, especially regarding the required level of risk 
awareness
72
 and the likelihood that the risk would materialize.
73
 Since the 
Tadić opinion itself is the basis for much of this confusion, it is there we 
turn first in search of its understanding of risk.  
 
 
 66. JCE III was not alleged in the indictment as a basis for the defendant’s liability for the 
murders in Jaskići. Id. at n.130. 
 67. Tadić Appeal Judgment ¶¶ 227–28.  
 68. Tadić Appeal Judgment ¶ 227 iii. 
 69. Id. ¶ 228. 
 70. Id. In most, if not all, cases whether the prosecution proves the mens rea element will depend 
on the defendant’s conduct because “[i]n practice, the significance of the accused's contribution will be 
relevant to demonstrating that the accused shared the intent to pursue the common purpose.” 
Prosecutor v. Kovčka, et al., Case No. IT-98-30/1-A, Judgment ¶ 97 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Feb. 28, 2005), available at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kvocka/acjug/en/kvo-aj050228e. 
pdf [hereinafter Kovčka Appeal Judgment]. 
 71. Tadić Appeal Judgment ¶ 228. 
 72. Compare Kovčka Appeal Judgment ¶ 86 (“A participant may be responsible for such crimes 
only if the Prosecution proves that the accused had sufficient knowledge such that the additional 
crimes were a natural and foreseeable consequence to him.”), with Prosecutor v. S. Milosević, Case 
No. IT-02-54, Decision on Motion for Judgment of Acquittal ¶ 290 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia June 16, 2004), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/slobodan_milosevic/tdec/en/040616.pdf 
(stating that attribution is appropriate if “it was reasonably foreseeable to him” that other crimes would 
be committed by a participant in the joint criminal enterprise). 
 73. Compare Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgment ¶ 150 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 19, 2004), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kvocka/acjug/en/kvo-aj050228e. 
pdf (“[T]he accused participated in that enterprise aware of the probability that other crimes may 
result.”), with Prosecutor v. S. Milosević, Case No. IT-02-54, Decision on Motion for Judgment of 
Acquittal ¶ 290 (stating that the crime charged must be a “possible consequence” of executing the 
JCE). 
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D. Risk and Mens Rea 
The facts supporting the existence of, and Tadić’s participation in, a 
JCE were: (1) he was “an armed member of an armed group;”74 (2) the 
armed group attacked the village of Jaskići and Tadić “actively took part 
in this attack, rounding up and severely beating some of the men;”75 
(3) the armed group was violent, beating some of the men from the village 
“into insensibility[] as they lay on the road”76 and threatening witnesses 
with death as the men were being taken away; and (4) five men, who had 
been alive, were found dead, after the armed group, including Tadić, had 
left the village.
77
 Based on this evidence the Appeals Chamber concluded:  
[T]he only possible inference to be drawn is that the Appellant had 
the intention to further the criminal purpose to rid the Prijedor 
region of the non-Serb population, by committing inhumane acts 
against them. That non-Serbs might be killed in the effecting of this 
common aim was, in the circumstances of the present case, 
foreseeable. The Appellant was aware that the actions of the group 
of which he was a member were likely to lead to such killings, but 
he nevertheless willingly took that risk.
78
 
In just this brief passage, the Appeals Chamber used two different terms 
—“foreseeable” and “aware”—when describing the mens rea required to 
prove participation in a JCE III. To further complicate the picture, in an 
earlier portion of the opinion, the Court stated “everyone in the group must 
have been able to predict this result.”79 As one post-Tadić Trial Chamber 
observed, “[i]t is unfortunate that expressions conveying different shades 
of meaning have been used . . . apparently interchangeably.”80 
 
 
 74. Tadić Appeal Judgment ¶ 232. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. ¶ 181. 
 78. Id. ¶ 232. 
 79. Id. ¶ 220 (emphasis in the original). The Tadić Appeals Chamber described this state of mind 
as dolus eventualis or advertent recklessness. Id. Advertent recklessness is recognized in English law. 
See Stephen P. Garvey, What’s Wrong with Involuntary Manslaughter?, 85 TEX.L.REV. 333, 340 n.38 
(2006). 
 80. Prosecutor v. Brᵭanin and Talić, Case No. IT-99-36-PT, Decision on Form of Further 
Amended Indictment and Prosecution Application to Amend, ¶ 29 n.112 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia June 26 2001), available at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/brdanin/tdec/en/10626 
FI215879.htm.  
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Nonetheless, that same Trial Chamber concluded that the words 
“predictable” and “foreseeable” are truly interchangeable in this context.81 
Both terms involve foretelling that a future event (consequence) will 
happen.
82
 Awareness, on the other hand, is equated with knowledge.
83
 It 
would seem to be epistemologically impossible to have actual knowledge 
that conduct will bring about a particular result. The Lubanga Trial 
Chamber recognized this impossibility when it observed that the “co-
perpetrators only ‘know’ the consequences of the conduct once they have 
occurred.”84 Thus, a certain amount of contingency as to the result is built 
into whichever of the three terms is used, although arguably awareness 
requires a higher degree of certainty than foreseeability or predictability.
85
  
It is important to note that the Tadić Appeals Chamber used these three 
terms in different contexts. The murders of non-Serbs by members of the 
JCE were a foreseeable consequence of the plan to ethnically cleanse the 
villages by forcibly displacing the residents.
86
 “Aware,” on the other hand, 
referred to the defendant’s knowledge “that the actions of the group of 
which he was a member were likely to lead to such killings.”87 
“Predictability,” as it is used in Tadić, seems to quantify the likelihood 
that the risk will materialize, which is very high indeed if “everyone in the 
group”88 must be able to predict the specific crime that will be 
committed.
89
  
A source of disagreement among the post-Tadić Courts is whether the 
foreseeability of the commission of a crime not within the common plan is 
determined objectively (from a reasonable person’s standpoint) or 
subjectively (from the defendant’s standpoint).90 The language used by the 
Tadić Appeals Chamber unequivocally adopts the subjective standard:  
 
 
 81. Id. 
 82. 1 THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1003 (Leslie Brown ed., 1993) 
(defining foresee as “be aware of beforehand; predict”); 2 THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY 1003 (Leslie Brown ed., 1993) (defining predict as “[a]nnounce as an event that will 
happen in the future”). 
 83. 1 THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 157 (Leslie Brown ed. 1993). 
 84. Lubanga Judgment ¶ 1012.  
 85. The Model Penal Code recognizes that absolute certainty is not required. It defines the 
required level of certainty for “knowledge” as “practical certainty.” The MODEL PENAL CODE 
§ 2.20(2)(b)(ii) (1985). 
 86. See Tadić Appeal Judgment ¶ 204. Indeed, in some of the cases relied upon by the Tadić 
Court, the courts posited a causal relationship between the planned and unplanned crime. Id. ¶ 218. 
 87. Id. ¶ 232. 
 88. Id. ¶ 220. 
 89. Id. ¶ 220. 
 90. The jurisprudence of the ICTY provides no clear guidance on this question. See Danner & 
Martinez, supra note 5, at 106. The law in the United States is probably no better. See Note, 
Developments in the Law—Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L. REV. 920, 996 (1959). 
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It should be noted that more than negligence is required. What is 
required is a state of mind in which a person, although he did not 
intend to bring about a certain result, was aware that the actions of 
the group were most likely to lead to that result but nevertheless 
willingly that risk.
91
  
Nonetheless, some of the post-Tadić courts92 and, significantly, the late 
Professor/Judge Antonio Cassese, who was on the panel that decided 
Tadić, concluded that objective (reasonable person) foreseeability was the 
standard.
93
 The implications are quite significant, because if foreseeability 
is objectively determined then the standard for attributing liability for the 
most serious crimes is reduced to something akin to negligence.
94
 Since 
objective foreseeability demands only that a reasonable person in the 
defendant’s position would have foreseen the risk that crimes beyond the 
criminal purpose of the JCE were likely, then the defendant, even if she 
was not actually aware, “should” have been aware of that risk as well.95 
Imposing liability for serious crimes based upon less than some form of 
actual risk awareness would run afoul of the principle of culpability.
96
 
It is unclear how “reasonable foreseeability” found its way into the 
post-Tadić case law.97 The Tadić Court drew on a number of diverse 
sources, including post-World War II British and U.S. war crimes cases,
98
 
World War II war crimes cases prosecuted in the Italian courts,
99
 
international treaties,
100
 and national law cases from both civil and 
 
 
 91. Tadić Appeal Judgment ¶ 220. 
 92. See, e.g., infra note 113 and cases cited therein.  
 93. Cassese, supra note 33, at 201; see also Amicus Curiae Brief of Professor Antonio Cassese, ¶ 
26, Prosecutor v. Kaing (“Duch”), Case No. 001/18-07-2007-ECCC/OCIJ (PTC 02) at 298–99.) 
(Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia October 27, 2008) (“It would, however, also be 
necessary for the ‘secondary offender’ . . . to be in a position, under the man of reasonable prudence 
test, to predict the rape.”). 
 94. Danner & Martinez, supra note 5, at 108–09. 
 95. See Cassese, supra note 33, at 200–01 (arguing that this “lower threshold” of liability is 
appropriate). 
 96. See Guliyeva, supra note 16, at 62 (citing Ambos, supra note 24, at 175). 
 97. The only support for this position in the Tadić case itself comes from its citation of the 
Pinkerton doctrine (United States v. Pinkerton, 328 U.S. 640 (1946)) which it said imputed criminal 
responsibility “for acts committed in furtherance of a common criminal purpose, whether the acts are 
explicitly planned or not, provided that such acts might have been reasonably contemplated as a 
probable consequence or likely result of the common criminal purpose.” Tadić Appeal Judgment, 
¶ 224 n.289. All the other cases cited in Tadić that specifically addressed the question required 
subjective foreseeability. See e.g., Tadić Appeal Judgment ¶ 224 nn.287, 288 and 290. 
 98. Id. ¶¶ 205–15. 
 99. Id. ¶¶ 214–19. 
 100. Id. ¶¶ 221–23. 
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common law countries.
101
 From its survey of these sources, the Tadić 
Court concluded that there was a “consistency and cogency of the case law 
and the treaties” that supported the conclusion that JCE III was customary 
international law.
102
 It observed, however, that the “major legal systems of 
the world [do not] take the same approach to this notion.”103 And, while 
the mens rea “was not clearly spelled out” in those cases, a fair inference 
was that they “required that the event must have been predictable.”104 
Several paragraphs later, the Court was even more specific regarding what 
level of foresight was required when it said, “everyone in the group must 
have been able to predict the result.”105  
By requiring that deviatory crimes be predictable to every member of 
the JCE, the Appeals Chamber established a mens rea for attributing 
liability via JCE III that substantially exceeds “mere foreseeability.”106 
Former ICTY Judge Shahabuddeen, who also was on the panel that 
decided Tadić, described the mens rea as exceeding awareness:  
In Tadić, the Appeals Chamber did use the word ‘aware’ but its 
judgment shows that it was speaking of more than awareness. It was 
referring to a case in which the accused, when committing the 
original crime, was able to ‘predict’ that a further crime would be 
committed by his colleagues as the ‘natural and foreseeable 
consequence of the effecting of [the] common purpose’ of the 
parties . . . and that he nevertheless ‘willingly’ took the ‘risk’ of that 
further crime being committed.
107
  
Thus, JCE III liability occurs only when the risk of a crime outside the 
common purpose was “a predictable consequence of the execution of the 
common design.”108 Predictability or foreseeability, in turn, is directly 
linked to the purpose of the JCE in which the defendant intentionally 
participated.
109
 This goes well beyond a general awareness that other 
 
 
 101. Id. ¶¶ 224–25. 
 102. Id. ¶ 226. 
 103. Id. ¶ 225 
 104. Id. ¶ 218.  
 105. Id. ¶ 220 (emphasis in the original). 
 106. Ambos, supra note 24, at 172–73.  
 107. Prosecutor v. Brᵭanin, Case No. IT-99-36-A, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal, ¶ 7 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 19, 2004) (Separate Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen). 
 108. Tadić Appeal Judgment ¶ 204. 
 109. Some of the cases discussed in Tadić describe a causal relationship between the agreed upon 
crime and the deviatory crime.  
“’For there to be a relationship of material causality between the crime willed by one of the 
participants and the different crime committed by another, it is necessary that the latter crime 
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crimes might occur. Instead, it requires that the defendant be able to 
predict a specific crime that actually did occur and that he “willingly” took 
that risk.
110
 Thus, in Tadić, murder was a predictable consequence of 
ethnic cleansing by the commission of inhumane acts directed at the non-
Serb population of Prijedor.
111
  
From the foregoing analysis, two points regarding the Tadić Appeals 
Chamber’s approach to risk are clear: (1) foreseeability requires 
knowledge of the risk of commission of specific crimes that could have 
been, but were not, part of the agreement or common plan, and (2) the test 
is actual foreseeability (subjective) and not reasonable foreseeability 
(objective). Unfortunately, not all the post-Tadić courts have seen it that 
way, especially on the question of whether the assessment of risk 
awareness is a subjective
112
 or objective determination.
113
 
Another source of disagreement among the post-Tadić courts regards 
the substantiality of the risk, i.e., how likely it is that the risk will 
 
 
should constitute the logical and predictable development of the former.’”  
Tadić Appeal Judgment ¶ 218 (quoting Mannelli, a decision of the Italian Court of Cassation, July 20, 
1949). 
 110. See, e.g., Brᵭanin, Case No. IT-99-36-A, Judgment, ¶ 411 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Apr. 3, 2007) (stating that the deviatory crime was foreseeable “in order to carry out the 
actus reus of the crimes forming part of the common purpose”); Prosecutor v. S. Milosević, Case No. 
IT-02-54-T, Decision on Motion for Judgment of Acquittal, ¶ 292 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia June 16, 2004) (observing it was foreseeable that genocide would be committed by other 
participants in the JCE “as a consequence of the commission of those crimes [that were part of the 
common plan]”). 
 111. Tadić Appeal Judgment ¶ 232. 
 112. See, e.g., Kovčka, Appeal Judgment ¶ 86 (“A participant may be responsible for such crimes 
only if the Prosecution proves that the accused had sufficient knowledge such that the additional 
crimes were a natural and foreseeable consequence to him.”); Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-
A, Judgment, ¶ 150 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 19, 2004) (holding that “it is 
sufficient that their occurrence [other criminal acts] was foreseeable to him”); Prosecutor v. Stakić, 
Case No. IT-97-24-A, Judgment, ¶ 65 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 22, 2006) 
(“[T]he crime must be shown to have been foreseeable to the accused in particular.”) 
 113. Prosecutor v. S. Milosević, Case No. IT-02-54, Decision on Motion for Judgment of 
Acquittal, ¶ 290 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 16, 2004) (stating that attribution is 
appropriate if “it was reasonably foreseeable to him” that other crimes would be committed by a 
participant in the joint criminal enterprise); Prosecutor v. Brᵭanin, Case No. IT-99-36-A, Decision on 
Interlocutory Appeal, ¶ 5 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 19, 2004), available at 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/brdanin/acdec/en/040319.htm (stating that it is sufficient that it was 
“reasonably foreseeable to the accused that the crime charged would be committed by other members 
of the joint criminal enterprise”); Amicus Curiae Brief of Professor Antonio Cassese, at 298-9926, 
Prosecutor v. Kaing (“Duch”), Case No. 001/18-07-2007-ECCC/OCIJ (PTC 02), (Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia Oct. 27, 2008) (“It would, however, also be necessary for the 
‘secondary offender’ . . . to be in a position, under the man of reasonable prudence test, to predict the 
rape.”). 
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materialize, because de minimus risks should not result in criminal 
punishment.
114
  
The Tadić Court set the risk level that deviant crimes will occur at 
“most likely.”115 A subsequent ICTY Trial Chamber stated that “most 
likely” means “probable (if not more).”116 But, according to the Trial 
Chamber, because Tadić said that its standard was the same as dolus 
eventualis, that “would seem to reduce [the risk] . . . to a possibility.”117 It 
is not at all clear why the Trial Chamber opted for “possibility,” especially 
since it acknowledged that there are stronger and weaker versions of dolus 
eventualis.
118
 Moreover, Professor Cassese observed that a “good 
definition” of dolus eventualis is found in the New York Penal Law, 
inspired by the Model Penal Code, which requires that the defendant is 
“aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk 
that such result will occur.”119 The drafters of the Model Penal Code 
described recklessness as an “awareness . . . of risk, that is of a probability 
less than substantial certainty.”120 The risk is substantial and unjustifiable 
if consciously disregarding it is a “gross deviation from the standard of 
conduct that a law-abiding person in the actor’s situation would 
observe.”121 Thus, the Model Penal Code defines recklessness “in terms of 
both greater risk and subjective awareness.”122 
Tadić is essentially consistent with this approach. The deviant crime 
must be related closely enough to the common plan that the risk of its 
occurrence is a “natural and foreseeable consequence” of carrying out the 
common plan (substantial risk). The specific deviant crime that occurs 
must have been predictable to every member of the JCE (actual 
 
 
 114. David M. Treiman, infra note 121, at 337–38. 
 115. Tadić Appeal Judgment ¶ 220.  
 116. Prosecutor v. Brᵭanin and Talić Case No. IT-99-36-PT, Decision on Form of Further 
Amended Indictment and Prosecution Application to Amend, ¶ 29 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia June 26, 2001). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. ¶ 29 n.112. (“The extent to which the possibility must be perceived differs according to 
the particular country in which the civil law is adopted, but the highest would appear to be that there 
must be a "concrete" basis for supposing that the particular consequence will follow.”); see also Kai 
Ambos, Critical Issues in the Bemba Confirmation Decision, 22 LEIDEN J. OF INT’L L. 715, 718 
(2009) (“In this regard one must not overlook the fact that the ‘commonly agreed’ standard [for dolus 
eventualis] invoked by the Chamber is by no means the only one.”). 
 119. Cassese, supra note 33, at 67 n.21 (quoting N.Y. PENAL CODE § 15.05(3)); see also MODEL 
PENAL CODE § 2.02 (2)(c) (1985). 
 120. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 cmt. 3(1985). 
 121. Id.; David M. Treiman, Recklessness and the Model Penal Code, 9 AM. J. CRIM. L. 281, 337 
(1981). 
 122. Wayne R. LaFave, CRIMINAL LAW § 5.4 (b), 282–83 n.26 (5th ed. 2010). 
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awareness). And, finally, the defendant must willingly take the risk 
(conscious risk taking).
123
  
Nonetheless, the post-Tadić ICTY cases are in disarray. 124 Little 
wonder, then, that Tadić has been criticized for its inherent instability and 
tendency to produce inconsistent results.
125
 
III. FROM THE ICTY TO THE ICC 
As the caseload at the ICC began to ramp up, it was apparent that the 
ICTY’s approach to recklessness approach lacked clarity.126 Tadić’s 
formulation (some say creation) of JCE III had been widely criticized.
127
 
There was disagreement whether the mens rea for JCE III was objective or 
subjective and the ICTY had adopted no clear standard for risk 
quantification.
128
 Moreover, neither the language nor the drafting history 
of Article 30 suggested that it embraced recklessness.
129
  It was, therefore, 
somewhat surprising that in the first opinion dealing with the subject, ICC 
Pre-Trial Chamber I concluded that Article 30 “also encompasses other 
 
 
 123. See supra pp. 687–88. 
 124. Compare Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgment ¶ 150 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 19, 2004) (“[T]he accused participated in that enterprise aware of the 
probability that other crimes may result.”); Prosecutor v. Brᵭanin, Case No. IT-99-36-A, Decision on 
Interlocutory Appeal, ¶ 5 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 19 2004) (stating that JCE 
III liability for deviant crimes is established if the accused participated in the enterprise “with the 
awareness that the commission of that agreed upon crime made it reasonably foreseeable to him that 
the crime charged would be committed”) with Prosecutor v. S. Milosević, Case No. IT-02-54, Decision 
on Motion for Judgment of Acquittal ¶ 290 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 16, 
2004) (stating that the crime charged must be a “possible consequence” of executing the JCE); 
Prosecuctor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment ¶ 587 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia July 31, 2003) (equating dolus eventualis to the U.S. concept of reckless or “depraved 
heart” murder and observing that “if the killing is committed with ‘manifest indifference to the value 
of human life’, even conduct of minimal risk can qualify as intentional homicide.”). See also 
Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, Pre-Trial Chamber II, Decision Pursuant to 
Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre 
Bemba Gombo, ¶ 363 (June 15, 2009) [hereinafter Bemba Decision]. 
 125. See Harmen van der Wilt, Guilty by Association: Joint Criminal Enterprise on Trial, 5 J. 
INT’L. CRIM. L. 91, 101 (2006). 
 126. See supra notes 72–73 and accompanying text.  
 127. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
 128. See supra notes 112, 113, 124, and 125 and accompanying text. 
 129. THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE 205 (Roy 
S. Lee ed., 1999). 
There was agreement that, in principle, all the crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court 
would require intent and knowledge unless specifically provided otherwise. After it was 
pointed out that the word recklessness did not appear anywhere in the definitions of crimes, it 
was agreed that a definition of that concept was unnecessary. The article was then adopted. 
See also WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
86–87 (2001).   
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forms of the concept of dolus [eventualis] which have already been 
resorted to by the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals.”130 Some scholars 
endorsed the opinion;
131
 others did not.
132
  
Two years later, in the Bemba decision, Pre-Trial Chamber II reached 
the opposite conclusion.
133
 The Pre-Trial Chamber looked to the language 
of Article 30 that requires at minimum, “[u]nless otherwise specified,” that 
a defendant have an “awareness that . . . a consequence will occur in the 
ordinary course of events.”134The Pre-trial Chamber concluded that this 
language “does not accommodate a lower standard than the one required 
by dolus directus in the second degree (oblique intention).”135 Later on, 
after observing that Article 30 requires that the “occurrence is close to 
certainty,” the Pre-Trial Chamber opined that “[t]his standard is 
undoubtedly higher than the principal standard commonly agreed upon for 
dolus eventualis—namely, foreseeing the occurrence of the undesired 
consequences as a mere likelihood or possibility.”136 Bemba too had its 
detractors
137
 and supporters.
138
 
Thus, the issue was joined and awaited (at least temporary) resolution 
in the ICC’s first Trial Chamber decision.  
 
 
 130. PTC Decision ¶ 352 (citing the Tadić Appeal Judgment ¶ 219 and the Stakić Trial Judgment 
¶ 587).  
 131. Thomas Weigend, Intent, Mistake, and Co-Perpetration in the Lubanga Decision on 
Confirmation of Charges, 6 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 471, 484 (2008) (approving the Pre-Trial Chamber’s 
inclusion of a strong form of dolus eventualis as consistent with Article 30). 
 132. Jens David Ohlin, Joint Intentions to Commit International Crimes, 11 CHI. J. INT’L L. 693, 
724 (2011) (observing that “it is not at all clear” that dolus eventualis satisfies the requirements of 
Article 30). 
 133. Bemba Decision ¶ 360. 
 134. Rome Statute, art. 30 (1), (2)(b),(3). 
 135. Bemba Decision ¶ 360. The Pre-Trial Chamber defined dolus directus in the second degree 
as: 
Dolus Directus in the second degree does not require that the suspect has the actual intent or 
will to bring about the material elements of the crime, but that he or she is aware that those 
elements will be the almost inevitable outcome of his acts or omissions, i.e., the suspect ‘is 
aware that [. . .] [the consequence] will occur in the ordinary course of events’ (article 
30(2)(b) of the Statute).  
Id. ¶ 359. 
 136. Id. ¶¶ 362–63. 
 137. Kai Ambos, Critical Issues in the Bemba Confirmation Decision, 22 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 715, 
718 (2009) (“In this regard one must not overlook the fact that the ‘commonly agreed’ standard 
invoked by the Chamber is by no means the only one. In fact, there are other, more cognitive concepts 
of dolus eventualis (requiring awareness or certainty as to a consequence) and these may indeed be 
included in Article 30.”) 
 138. Johan D. van der Vyver, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 241 
(2010). 
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A. Lubanga 
In Prosecutor v. Lubanga, the Trial Chamber defined co-perpetration 
in Article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute as including a risk-taking 
element.
139
 It held that committing a crime jointly with another or through 
another person provided for liability based on co-perpetration.
140
 Co-
perpetration, in turn, requires adherence by the defendant to an agreement 
or common plan . . . The plan can, but need not, be “intrinsically 
criminal,” so long as it includes “a critical element of criminality.”141 The 
“critical element of criminality” has both an objective and subjective 
element. The objective element is satisfied if the “implementation [of the 
plan] embodies a sufficient risk that, in the ordinary course of events, a 
crime will be committed.”142 The subjective element, found in Article 
30(3), is satisfied if the “co-perpetrators are aware of the risk that the 
consequence, prospectively, will occur.”143 
In addition to agreeing to the common plan and being aware of its risk 
of criminality, the defendant must make an “essential contribution” to its 
implementation.
144
 Whether the contribution is essential “is to be based on 
an analysis of the common plan and the role that was assigned to, or was 
assumed by the co-perpetrator, according to the division of tasks.”145 
Moreover, there must be proof that the defendant “was aware that he 
provided an essential contribution to the implementation of the common 
plan.”146 Finally, the crime must be “the result of the combined and 
coordinated contributions of those involved, or at least two of them.”147 
As to the mens rea, the Trial Chamber’s opinion is hardly a model of 
clarity. Having predicated liability on a plan that presented a risk that a 
certain result would occur, the Trial Chamber acknowledged that at the 
time the plan was formed, at best, the co-perpetrators could only have an 
 
 
 139. Lubanga Judgment ¶¶ 985–86. 
 140. Id. ¶ 980. 
 141. Id. ¶ 984. 
 142. Id. ¶ 987. 
 143. Id. ¶ 986. 
 144. Lubanga Judgment ¶ 999. The Trial Chamber thus rejected both the Pre-Trial Chamber’s 
conclusion, urged by the defense, that the defendant’s role had to be a conditio sine qua non of the 
crime; that is, that the failure of the defendant to perform the tasks assigned to him would frustrate the 
plan. It also rejected the prosecutor’s argument that the defendant’s contribution need only be 
“substantial.” Id. ¶¶ 989–92. 
 145. Id. ¶ 1000. 
 146. Id. ¶ 1013. 
 147. Id. ¶ 994. 
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awareness of a contingent result, even as to the crimes they had agreed 
upon, until those crimes were committed.
148
  
Article 30 of the Rome Statute sets out the mental element that must be 
proved in order for a defendant to be held criminally responsible for a 
crime within the jurisdiction of the Court. “Unless otherwise provided,” 
the prosecution must prove “intent and knowledge” as to each material 
element.
149
 Similar to the approach taken in the Model Penal Code, 
different mental states relate to different material elements.
150
 As to a 
conduct element, the person must act with intent; that is, the “person 
means to engage in the conduct.”151 As to the result or consequence, the 
defendant may either intend to cause the consequence or be aware (know) 
that the consequence “will occur in the ordinary course of events.”152  
From the language in Article 30(2)(b) of the Rome Statute, the Trial 
Chamber concluded that co-perpetration requires an “awareness” of the 
risk that a consequence of the agreement or common plan “will occur in 
the ordinary course of events.”153 The Trial Chamber, however, rejected 
the Pre-Trial Chamber’s conclusion that Article 30 encompasses dolus 
eventualis,
154
 because the drafting history of the Rome Statute “suggests” 
that this form of mens rea was not included in Article 30.
155
 According to 
the Trial Chamber, the distinction between the knowledge required by 
Article 30 and dolus eventualis is that Article 30 requires awareness that 
consequences “will occur,” while dolus eventualis requires only awareness 
that the consequences “may occur.”156  
Despite the Trial Chamber’s insistence that its approach to the mens 
rea required for the “risk” element of co-perpetration is different from the 
Pre-Trial Chamber’s, on closer examination, their differences appear to be 
more a matter of labeling than substance.
157
 The Pre-Trial Chamber 
identified two forms of dolus eventualis: substantial risk and low risk. It 
defined the objective element of substantial risk as a likelihood that that 
 
 
 148. Id. ¶ 1012 (“The co-perpetrators only ‘know’ the consequences of the conduct once they have 
occurred.”). 
 149. Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 30(1). 
 150. Compare Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 30(1), (2), (3), with MODEL PENAL CODE 
§ 2.02(2) (1985). 
 151. Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 30(2)(a). 
 152. Id. art. 30(2)(b). 
 153. Lubanga Judgment ¶¶ 1011–12. 
 154. Lubanga PTC Decision ¶ 355. 
 155. Lubanga Judgment ¶ 1011. 
 156. Id. 
 157. PTC Decision ¶¶ 352–54. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
686 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 13:667 
 
 
 
 
the risk “will occur in the ordinary course of events.”158 In substantial risk 
situations, the defendant’s mens rea is established by proof that she was 
aware of the substantial likelihood that her actions “would result” in the 
commission of a crime and her decision to act “despite such awareness.”159 
In low risk situations the defendant “must have clearly or expressly 
accepted the idea” that the crime “may” occur.160 
In substantial risk situations, there is little, if any, practical distinction 
between the language used by the Pre-Trial Chamber and that used by the 
Trial Chamber. At one point the Trial Chamber defines knowledge of a 
future event, per Article 30(3), as “awareness by the co-perpetrators that a 
consequence will occur (in the future), [which] necessarily means that the 
co-perpetrators are aware of the risk that the consequences, prospectively, 
will occur.”161 Later on, it stated its view that awareness of a future 
consequence “means that the participants anticipate, based on their 
knowledge of how events ordinarily develop, that the consequence will 
occur in the future.”162 And finally, the Trial Chamber found that when the 
co-perpetrators agree on the common plan, they “must know [of] the 
existence of a risk that the consequence will occur” and the “degree of the 
risk . . . must be no less than awareness on the part of the co-perpetrator 
that the consequence ‘will occur in the ordinary course of events.’ A low 
risk will not be sufficient.”163  
What does this mean other than that the risk of the commission of a 
crime must have been substantial at the time the defendants entered into 
the common plan?
164
 Moreover, this approach is practically the same as 
that of the Pre-Trial Chamber.
165
 In substantial risk cases, the Pre-Trial 
Chamber characterized the requisite level of awareness as “the substantial 
likelihood that his or her actions or omissions would result in the 
realisation of the objective elements of the crime.”166 Thus, at least in the 
substantial risk cases, there appears to be no significant difference in the 
 
 
 158. Id. ¶ 353. 
 159. Id.  
 160. Id. ¶ 354. I agree with Professor Weigand that the Pre-Trial Chamber’s formulation of low 
risk dolus eventualis, if that form exists, would not satisfy Article 30(2)(b) of the Rome Statute. 
Weigand, supra note 131, at 484. 
 161. Lubanga Judgment ¶ 986.  
 162. Id. ¶ 1012. 
 163. Id. 
 164. See Weigand, supra note 131, at 482. 
 165. The Pre-Trial Chamber did not say, as the Trial Chamber implied, that it is sufficient if such 
awareness is that the consequence “may” result from the defendant’s conduct. . . . PTC Decision, 
¶ 353.  
 166. Id.  
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approaches to mens rea taken by the Pre-Trial and Trial Chambers and, 
therefore, the observations of one commentator regarding the Pre-Trial 
Chamber’s opinion are equally applicable to the Trial Chamber’s opinion: 
Criminal lawyers from common law jurisdictions would hardly 
describe this mental requirement as anything close to intentional or 
purposeful. At most, it is a form of advertent recklessness. Criminal 
lawyers from civil law jurisdictions will often refer to this mental 
element as dolus eventualis and consider it uncontroversial, but the 
ICC’s use of the concept here bears scrutiny.167 
If this observation is correct, and I think it is, then the very same questions 
about the mens rea for attributing liability that have plagued the ICTY 
have already surfaced in the ICC.
168
 Three ICC cases (all decided before 
the Lubanga Trial Chamber decision) suggest that the ICC, so far, is no 
better than the ICTY in its approach to risk analysis. 
B. Bemba 
Jean-Pierre Bemba was the president of the Mouvement de Libération 
du Congo (MLC) and commander of its military arm, the Armée de 
Libération du Congo (ALC).
169
 The MLC was based in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC).
170
 Bemba ordered MLC troops sent to the aid 
of Patassé, the democratically elected president of the Central African 
Republic (CAR).
171
 According to witness testimony credited by the Pre-
Trial Chamber, Bemba’s instructions to the MLC troops were to 
“‘destabilize all the enemies’ coming from the DRC” and “defend the 
president [Patassé].”172 Based on this evidence, the Pre-Trial Chamber 
could not conclude that “Bemba was aware that, in the ordinary course of 
events, the commission of rape would be the virtually certain consequence 
of his action.”173  
 
 
 167. Ohlin, supra note 23, at 723–24.  
 168. In this regard, it is important to note that the Lubanga Trial Chamber was dealing only with 
the issue of mens rea for crimes that were part of the agreement or common plan. Lubanga Judgment, 
¶ 1. In fact, illegally enlisting child soldiers was the only international crime charged in furtherance of 
the common plan “to ensure that the UPC/FPLC had an army strong enough to achieve its political and 
military aims.” Id. ¶ 1347. 
 169. Bemba Decision ¶ 455. 
 170. Id. ¶ 99. 
 171. Id. ¶ 392. 
 172. Id.  
 173. Id. ¶ 396. 
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Nor could it find that evidence that Patassé was informed that crimes 
had been committed by Bemba’s troops, coupled with evidence showing 
frequent communications between Patassé and Bemba, was sufficient to 
prove that Bemba learned about the commission of crimes from Patassé.
174
 
Finally, the prosecution argued that Bemba’s mens rea was established by 
his continued implementation of the common plan despite evidence that: 
(1) media had broadcast that the MLC had committed crimes in the CAR; 
(2) the MLC had informed Bemba of the commission of crimes in the 
CAR; and (3) Bemba had acknowledged the commission of these crimes 
himself.
175
  
The Pre-Trial Chamber, nonetheless, rejected the prosecution’s 
argument that this evidence satisfied Article 30 stating: 
In particular, the Chamber cannot infer that he was aware that by 
keeping his troops in the CAR, it was a virtually certain 
consequence that these crimes would be committed in the ordinary 
course of events. As the Disclosed Evidence indicates, the most that 
can be inferred is that Mr. Jean-Pierre Bemba may have foreseen 
the risk of occurrence of such crimes as a mere possibility and 
accepted it for the sake of achieving his ultimate goal—that is, to 
help Mr. Patassé retain power. In the Chamber’s opinion, this does 
not meet the required standard for article 30 of the Statute—namely, 
dolus directus in the second degree.
176
 
C. Banda and Jerbo 
In this case, the ICC prosecutor charged the defendants with organizing 
and commanding an armed attack against a compound of UN 
peacekeepers in Darfur, Sudan.
177
 The Pre-Trial Chamber found 
substantial evidence to support a finding that the defendants ordered the 
attack, personally participated in it, led their troops during the attack and 
therefore “meant to engage in the attack.”178 In these circumstances, the 
Pre-Trial Chamber had little difficulty concluding that, although there was 
 
 
 174. Id. ¶ 397. 
 175. Id. ¶ 398. 
 176. Id. ¶ 400. 
 177. Prosecutor v. Banda and Jerbo, Case No. ICC-02/05-03/09, Corrigendum of the “Decision on 
the Confirmation of Charges” ¶¶ 4–5 (Mar. 7, 2011) [hereinafter Banda]. They were charged with 
violence to life and attempted violence to life under the Rome Statute, supra note 3, arts. 8(2)(c)(i), 
25(3)(a) and 25(3)(f), intentionally attacking a peacekeeping mission under arts. 8(2)(e)(iii), and 
25(3)(a) and pillaging under arts. 8(2)(e)(v) and 25(3)(a). Id. ¶ 5. 
 178. Id. ¶ 153. 
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no substantial evidence that the defendants “specifically meant to cause 
killings of protected AMIS personnel as a consequence of the attack,”179 
they still knew that killings would occur: “The fact of orchestrating an 
attack by numerous and heavily armed troops on a relatively small 
peacekeeping mission itself implies the virtual certainty that killings 
would ensue, a certainty which is consistent with the subjective element as 
defined in article 30 of the Statute.”180 
D. Kenyatta and Hussein 
In this case, the ICC prosecutor charged the defendants with entering 
into a common plan to keep the Kenyan pro-Party of National Unity 
(PNU)
181
 in power by “every means necessary,” including “orchestrating a 
police failure to prevent the commission of crimes,” committing 
widespread and systematic attacks against their political opponents, and 
deliberately failing to stop retaliatory attacks.
182
 To carry out the plan, 
Kenyatta mediated between the PNU and a criminal organization, the 
Mungiki, to obtain the support of the latter for the PNU.
183
 After the 
election, the defendants used the Mungiki to carry out retaliatory attacks 
against the political opposition in the Rift Valley in order to “strengthen 
the PNU’s hold on power. . . .”184 In the course of carrying out the plan, 
some of the Mungiki raped civilian residents of Nakuru and Naivasha.
185
 
Although there was no indication that rape was an intended crime, the 
defendants had directed the Mungiki to take revenge against civilians “in 
the knowledge of and exploiting the ethnic hatred of the attackers towards 
their victims.”186 Accordingly, the Pre-Trial Chamber concluded that the 
defendants “knew that rape was a virtually certain consequence of the 
implementation of the common plan.”187  
 
 
 179. Id. ¶ 155. 
 180. Id. ¶ 156. 
 181. Prosecutor v. Muthaura, Kenyatta and Hussein Ali, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11Decision on 
the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, ¶ 102 (Jan. 23, 
2012) [hereinafter Kenyata]. 
 182. Id. ¶ 288. 
 183. Id. ¶ 289. 
 184. Id. ¶ 290. 
 185. Id. ¶ 415. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
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E. Observations 
Perhaps the most striking thing about Banda and Kenyatta is their 
failure even to refer to risk. Both are cases of co-perpetration.
188
 
Moreover, unlike Lubanga, these cases dealt with deviant crimes; that is, 
crimes that were not a part of the common plan.
189
 Given the fact that both 
cases involved liability for crimes directly committed by others that were 
not part of the plan, those crimes were, at best, a risk at the time the 
defendants entered into the plans. Yet, neither court mentioned risk.
190
 
Instead both saw the mens rea as a straightforward application of Article 
30(2)(b).
191
  
Almost certainly, the Lubanga Trial Chamber decision would change 
the approach in these two cases to one involving risk analysis. Lubanga’s 
approach to co-perpetration applies in any case where the crime was 
committed by two or more persons.
192
 In such situations the result, in so 
far as any individual defendant is concerned, is contingent; i.e., “a 
sufficient risk that, if events follow the ordinary course, a crime will be 
committed.”193 The Lubanga Trial Chamber found that was so even where 
the crime committed was part of the common plan.
194
 It is even more so in 
cases like Banda and Kenyatta where deviant crimes are involved. If the 
crime was not part of the plan, how could its future occurrence be anything 
more than a risk? 
Bemba, on the other hand, shows just how hard it can be to find a 
defendant guilty if a court applies Article 30 literally. Put another way, 
absent a more flexible approach to attribution of liability, there will be 
impunity for defendants like Bemba who almost certainly must have 
known his troops were committing rape in the CAR. Bemba is a good 
illustration of the point made by an author who conducted an extensive 
study of ICTR Trial Chamber decisions: 
The fact-finding challenges identified in the foregoing chapters 
should cause us to question whether in fact we could use traditional 
doctrines of criminal liability in a great number of international 
 
 
 188. See Banda, ¶ 151; Kenyatta, ¶ 287.  
 189. Neither the killings in Banda nor the rapes in Kenyatta were part of the criminal plan. Id. 
 190. The Banda Pre-Trial Chamber cited the PTC Decision in Lubanga but did not mention that 
that court had concluded that Article 30 encompassed dolus eventualis. Banda, ¶ 150 n.259. 
 191. Kenyatta, ¶ 415; Banda, ¶ 156. Rome Statute, supra note 3, at art. 30(2)(b) (The “person is 
. . . aware that [the consequence] will occur in the ordinary course of events.”). 
 192. Lubanga Judgment, ¶¶ 980–981. 
 193. Id. ¶ 984. 
 194. Id. ¶¶ 984–987. 
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criminal cases. No one would deny that it is better to ground 
criminal convictions on reliable evidence of the defendant’s 
personal commission of criminal acts or omissions. But if such 
evidence does not exist in the vast run of cases, and if we have not 
decided to abandon international trials altogether, then it may be 
more normatively justified to respond to those evidentiary 
deficiencies by candidly expanding criminal liability doctrines than 
by ignoring those deficiencies and purporting to base convictions on 
traditional doctrines.
195
  
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
Risk is baked into co-perpetration.
196
 The ICC therefore must develop a 
consistent approach to risk analysis. Thus far, however, the debate has 
largely been about whether Article 30 of the Rome Statute includes JCE 
III (dolus eventualis). This is a sterile exercise which distracts from the 
real work of developing standards that courts can apply uniformly in order 
to achieve consistent results, a task at which the ICTY failed. The JCE III 
debate inevitably dredges up this unfortunate history, which the ICC quite 
rightly should try to avoid repeating. 
Based on the cases it has decided so far, it does not appear that the ICC 
will be any more systematic in its approach to risk analysis than the ICTY 
was. Nonetheless, one issue that troubled the ICTY does not appear to 
present a problem for the ICC. The language of Article 30
197
 seems to 
preclude the argument that risk awareness is assessed from an objective 
“reasonable person” perspective, and none of the cases has even 
considered that argument.
198
  
The question of risk quantification is far less clear. Thus far, only the 
Lubanga Trial Chamber has squarely addressed this issue and it failed to 
define what degree of risk is necessary in order for criminal liability to 
attach. Instead, it approached the question from the opposite direction 
when it stated that a co-perpetrator’s awareness of a “low risk will not be 
 
 
 195. NANCY AMOURY COMBS, FACT-FINDING WITHOUT FACTS: THE UNCERTAIN 
EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS 333 (2010). 
 196. See Neha Jain, supra note 1, at 170 (“[D]eviations from the common plan that are within the 
range of relevant acts with which one must normally reckon do not count as an excess. The main test is 
the foreseeability of the deviant course of action.”). 
 197. Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 30(3) (“For the purposes of this article, ‘knowledge’ means 
awareness that a circumstance exists or a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events.”). 
 198. See e.g., Lubanga Judgment, ¶ 1012 (“At the time the co-perpetrators agree on a common 
plan and throughout its implementation, they must know the existence of a risk that the consequence 
will occur.”). 
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sufficient.”199 Clarifying the degree (substantiality) of the risk is critical 
because “criminal liability ought to require more than an ordinary 
deviation from a legal norm.”200 Quantifying the risk by stating what is not 
sufficient gives other courts no guidance on what is sufficient. 
The ICC has also failed to address the issue of risk certainty. On this 
question, the cases have focused on the language of Articles 30 (2)(b) and 
(3), providing that a consequence “will occur in the ordinary course of 
events.”201 The Lubanga Trial Chamber, grappling with this concept, used 
several different terms conveying different shades of meaning: 
[T]he “awareness that a consequence will occur in the ordinary 
course of events” means that the participants anticipate, based on 
their knowledge of how events ordinarily develop, that the 
consequence will occur in the future. This prognosis involves 
consideration of the concepts of “possibility” and “probability,” 
which are inherent to the notions of “risk” and “danger.” Risk is 
defined as “danger, (exposure to) the possibility of loss, injury or 
other adverse circumstance.”202 
So must the risk be a “possibility” (“something that may exist or 
happen”)203 or a “probability” (“a thing judged likely to be true, to exist, or 
to happen”)?204 While it is true that these are closely related concepts, 
“probability” suggests a somewhat higher degree of certainty. It is 
significant, therefore, that the Trial Chamber used “possibility” when it 
defined risk, apparently opting for the lower standard.  
More importantly, how does this language square with that used by the 
Trial Chamber in the preceding paragraph of its opinion when it rejected 
the proposition that dolus eventualis was included in Article 30 because 
“[t]he plain language of the Statute, and most particularly the use of the 
words ‘will occur’ in Article 30(2)(b) as opposed to ‘may occur,’ excludes 
the concept of dolus eventualis.”205 If risk is by definition a “possible” 
consequence, how can a defendant ever be aware that it “will” occur? 
The Bemba Pre-Trial Chamber had a slightly different take on the 
phrase: “will occur in the ordinary course of events.”206 It opined that this 
 
 
 199. Lubanga Judgment, ¶ 1012. 
 200. Treiman, supra note 121, at 337. 
 201. Rome Statute, supra note 3, arts. 30(2)(b) and (3). 
 202. Lubanaga Judgment, ¶ 1012. 
 203. 2 THE NEW OXFORD SHORTER DICTIONARY, supra note 78, at 2302. 
 204. Id. at 2362.  
   205. Lubanga Judgment ¶ 1011. 
 206. Id.  
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phrase “clearly indicate[s] that the required standard of occurrence is close 
to certainty.”207 Thus, according to the Pre-Trial Chamber, Article 30 
requires a “virtual” or “practical” certainty that the “consequence will 
follow, barring an unforeseen or unexpected intervention that prevent [sic] 
its occurrence.”208 The problem with this approach, as I argued above, is 
that it is unlikely that any case involving risk could ever satisfy a “virtual” 
or “practical” certainty standard.209  
Thus, imprecise use of language and the failure to quantify risk— 
precisely the same problems that vexed the ICTY—have already surfaced 
in the ICC. The ICC should look to a new source for inspiration—the U.S. 
Model Penal Code (MPC).
210
 The drafters of the MPC directly confronted 
the challenge of systematizing an approach to the mental element of 
crime.
211
 Its approach to recklessness, while having similarities to JCE III, 
is a substantial improvement over it. 
One of the MPC’s greatest contributions to the development of 
criminal law is its articulation of a definition for recklessness, which 
guides courts in distinguishing between criminal and non-criminal 
conduct.
212
 In that regard, the MPC sets out distinctive criteria to ensure 
that a defendant who engages in risky conduct is sufficiently culpable to 
warrant criminal punishment.
213
 The first requirement is “conscious risk 
creation.”214 This means actual awareness (knowledge) of a risk.215 The 
risk must be both “substantial” and “unjustifiable.”216 The MPC does not 
define “substantial,” but the Commentary characterizes the risk of which 
the defendant is aware as “a probability less than substantial certainty.”217 
In other words, whether the risk will materialize is “something less than 
100% certainty” from the defendant’s perspective at the time she engages 
 
 
 207. Bemba Decision, supra note 125, ¶ 362. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Perhaps that is why the Lubanga Trial Chamber seemed to contradict itself when it followed 
Bemba’s rejection of dolus eventualis and then in the next paragraph defined risk in terms of 
“possibility” and “probability,” rather than virtual certainty. 
 210. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 40.  
 211. Id. § 2.02 cmt. 1. The commentary quotes Justice Jackson, who in United States v. 
Morissette, 342 U.S. 246, 252 (1952), wrote: “The unanimity with which [the courts] have adhered to 
the central thought that wrongdoing must be conscious to be criminal is emphasized by the variety, 
disparity and confusion of their definitions of the requisite but elusive mental element.” 
 212. See Treiman, supra note 121, at 284–85. 
 213. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 40, § 2.02 cmt. 3. (“[T]he jury is to make the culpability 
judgment in terms of whether the defendant’s conscious disregard of the risk justifies condemnation.”). 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id.; See also Treiman, supra note 121, at 299. 
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in the conduct.
218
 The MPC thus requires knowledge of the risk but 
somewhat less than knowledge that the result will occur. Nonetheless, the 
gap between the two is razor thin.
219
 
The early ICC cases, like Bemba, seem to focus on how certain a 
defendant is that a particular risk will occur in order to distinguish a mens 
rea that is sufficient for criminal liability (knowledge) from one that it is 
not (dolus eventualis).
220
 Interestingly, however, the highest form of 
culpability, “intent,” requires no level of risk awareness at all.221 
According to the Rome Statute, a person intends a consequence if she 
“means to cause that consequence.”222 This approach is substantially the 
same as that taken by the MPC, which uses the term “purposely” instead 
of intent, and provides that one acts purposely with regard to a result when 
it is “his conscious object . . . to cause such a result.”223 This does not 
require any degree of knowledge or awareness that the result will occur.
 224
 
So, at least in this respect, recklessness includes an additional mens rea 
element and thus may be even more difficult to prove than intent. 
Beyond actual risk awareness, the MPC also makes it clear that some 
risks, although substantial and foreseen, are justifiable; they are risks 
worth taking.
225
 Comments to an earlier draft of the MPC set out the 
 
 
 218. MARKUS D. DUBBER, CRIMINAL LAW: MODEL PENAL CODE 72 (2002). 
 219. For example, the MPC provides that in cases of “willful blindness,” when knowledge of the 
existence of a fact is required, it may be proved “if a person is aware of a high probability of its 
existence, unless he actually believes that it does not exist.” Model Penal Code, supra note 40, § 
2.02(7); see also Id. at cmt. 9. The commentary acknowledges that whether a defendant acts recklessly 
or knowingly when he is aware of “the probable existence of a material fact” but ignores it, “presents a 
subtle but important question.” Id. at cmt. 9. The commentary draws a distinction, however, between 
facts where “knowledge” is required and the results of conduct where recklessness is sufficient 
because the latter “is necessarily a matter of the future at the time of acting.” Id.; See also Wayne R. 
LaFave, Criminal Law 262 (5th ed. 2010) (stating that the purposely and knowledge provisions of the 
MPC “contemplate that one knows of present (as opposed to future) events only if he is actually aware 
of them”). 
 220. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
 221. Dubber, supra note 218, at 72–73. 
 222. Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 30(2)(b). 
 223. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 40, § 2. 02(a)(i). See Kai Ambos, Critical Issues in the 
Bemba Confirmation Decision, supra note 118, at 717 (The drafters of the Rome Statute used § 2.02 of 
the MPC, relating to the distinction between purpose and knowledge, as “a reference for the ICC 
Statute in many regards.”).  
 224. LaFave, supra note 122, at 261 n.14 and accompanying text. 
 225. The example given in the commentary is the surgeon who performs a highly risky operation 
because there is no other way to save the patient’s life. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 40, § 2.02 
cmt. 3. 
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factors to be taken into consideration in determining whether the risk is 
substantial and unjustifiable:  
Accordingly to aid the ultimate determination, the draft points 
expressly to the factors to be weighed in [the] judgment: the nature 
and degree of the risk disregarded by the actor, the nature and 
purpose of his conduct and the circumstances known to him in 
acting.
226
 
Requiring that the defendant is aware that the risk her conduct creates is 
both “substantial” and “unjustifiable” is “useful” but still not “sufficient” 
to establish criminal culpability because “[s]ome standard is needed for 
determining how substantial and how unjustifiable the risk must be.”227 
Thus, the MPC adds two additional requirements. The subjective element 
is that the defendant must “consciously disregard” the risk.228 The 
objective element is that disregarding the risk “involves a gross deviation 
from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in 
the actor’s situation.”229 The “gross deviation” standard requires the fact 
finder to determine that “the defendant’s conduct involved ‘culpability of 
high degree.’”230 
The MPC thus gives significantly more guidance to courts than any of 
the standards thus far articulated by the ICTY or the ICC. It especially 
focuses on risk quantification, and, as a result, it blunts the criticism 
leveled at JCE III—that it attributes liability in cases where culpability is 
lacking.
231
 The question remains, however, whether the ICC could adopt 
an MPC-like approach that would be consistent with the language in 
Article 30 of the Rome Statute.  
 
 
 226. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 cmt 3, at 125 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1955). The concept of 
justifiable risks and assessing whether they are worth taking is already a feature of international 
criminal law. For example, a commander may order an attack that will cause civilian casualties, so 
long as it is justified by military necessity. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, and Relating to the Protections of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 
art. 57, June 8 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 227. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 40, § 2.02 cmt. 3. 
 228. Id. § 2.02(222)(c). Conscious disregard of the risk implies an acceptance of the consequences 
and therefore aligns the MPC with the German theory of dolus eventualis, which is sufficient to 
establish criminal intent. See Dubber, supra note 218, at 74–76.  
 229. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 40, § 2.02(2)(c). 
 230. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 216, § 2.02, cmt. at 125 (Tent. Draft 4 1955). 
 231. See, e.g., John Laughland, Conspiracy, Joint Criminal Enterprise and Command 
Responsibility in International Criminal Law 3 (Nov. 14, 2009), available at http://www.heritage 
tpirdefense.org/papers/John_laughland_Conspiracy_joint_criminal_enterprise_and_command_respons
ibility.pdf. 
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The potential sticking point is Article 30’s requirement of knowledge 
in relation to consequence. It defines knowledge as “awareness that a 
circumstance exists or that a consequence will occur in the ordinary course 
of events.”232 Some of the ICC cases discussed above differentiated this 
standard from dolus eventualis because it requires only awareness that the 
result “may” occur, while Article 30 stipulates that there must be 
awareness that it “will” occur.233 If this approach is followed, then nothing 
short of virtual certainty that a risk will materialize will support a finding 
of guilt. 
Yet, “awareness that a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of 
events” must mean something different than “awareness that a 
circumstance exists.” Otherwise Article 30 would have said, “awareness of 
a consequence or that a circumstance exists.” A logical conclusion that 
can be drawn from the distinction Article 30 makes between the two 
situations is that knowledge that a fact exists requires a higher degree of 
certainty (“practical” or “virtual”) than knowledge that a particular result 
“will occur in the ordinary course of events” (contingent or risk 
awareness).
234
  
Thus, the concept that criminal liability may be based on a mens rea of 
less than actual knowledge is arguably built into Article 30. If that premise 
is correct, then so long as the defendant is actually aware of the risk and 
consciously decides to take it, her mens rea need not also include an 
element  of certainty that the risk will come to pass.
235
 By this view, the 
key to criminal culpability is risk awareness. And, it is plausible to read 
the language of Article 30 as requiring an “awareness that the risk will 
occur in the ordinary course of events.” Since the risk is now the 
“consequence,” that interpretation would be consistent with the language 
of Article 30. 
I have argued in this paper that the ICC should interpret Article 30 to 
include the safeguards provided in the MPC for affixing liability for risky 
conduct. Based on the few cases decided thus far, it already appears that 
this will be a recurring issue. Eventually, the Court will have to face the 
question squarely, and when it does, it either will incorporate some form 
 
 
 232. Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 30(3). 
 233. See, e.g., supra pp. 696–97.  
 234. The difference between knowledge and recklessness comes down to a difference in 
probabilities. Treiman, supra note 121, at 317. 
 235. Seevan der Vyver, supra note 138, at 245–46 (“If the intervening act or occurrence was 
‘unforeseen’ or ‘unexpected,’ it would not have been within the perpetrator’s contemplation and could 
therefore not affect the measure of certainty entertained by him or her that the proscribed consequence 
‘will occur.’”). 
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of recklessness into the Rome Statute, or it will allow political or military 
leaders to evade punishment for serious international crimes. The result of 
the latter course would be impunity for those most responsible, which 
would mean that the Court has failed to carry out one of its central 
missions. 
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